# Political And Social Infrastructure Towards High Quality Tourism Sites

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#### Abstract

The political and social infrastructure and tourism sites in regions has not ready to conduct a higher quality election. The existing objective conditions can only hold direct elections as a mere political routine. Therefore, to actualize a higher-quality election, the following steps are required: (1) strengthening the human resource capacity of Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) and Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD) members to specifically prepare the direct elections that will be held soon; (2) encouraging convention system party in the process of regional heads nomination; (3) forming a strong and independent supervisors of election that has broader, clearer, more decisive authority, professional, and able to work quickly; (4) creating a special judicial institution for election cases which consists of the police, prosecutors, and district court judges who are able to work quickly and professionally that have binding legal decisions and permanent legal force; (5) encouraging independent youth social organizations to control the performance of the electoral apparatus including Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD), and the upcoming election supervisory institutions; (6) promoting and campaigning for peaceful elections as well as political education for citizens, especially direct election; (7) Creating commitment of agreement for political groups competing in the regional elections facilitated by Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD), and the polices to prevent possible conflicts in the process of post-election.

Keywords: Political and Social infrastructure and tourism sites, Direct Election, tourism sites

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

Direct Regional-Head Election (Pilkada) is a new thing in Indonesia. In the past, the representative system election by the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) was well-known as regulated in Law Number 5 of 1974 concerning Regional Government and Law Number 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government. The new direct elections were recognized in Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government as a revision of the previous law. Various reactions appeared from various parties as responses to direct election policy which are regulated in 63 articles from 240 existing articles. The idea of direct election had raised pros and cons for some people who longed for changes to their fate (their region) and have less attention from the government. The pro group sees direct election will minimize the democracy deviation in the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) election, act as an entry point for political democracy in the regions because it can prevent money politics, minimize the intervention of political party administrators, and give every person the opportunity to choose their district-heads objectively.

Meanwhile, the contra group thinks that direct election is a premature idea and irrelevant decision. Improving the quality of the region's democracy is likely determined by another factor [1]. For example, the quality of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) and its voters is away from our expectation. In other words, the contra group strongly opposes the presence of direct election because it could create a democratic euphoria at the local level.

Some people argue that the Direct District-Head Election (Pilkada) is said to be a "leap of democracy". It means that Pilkada has both positive and negative effect. The positive effect is it provides opportunities for everyone to choose the Regional Head through a direct voting mechanism [2]. The activity aims to give freedom to choose their selection of Regional Head and Deputy Regional Head without coercion and intervention from any party. In the negative way, direct regional head elections are a "leap of democracy" that reflects the interpretation of direct election benefits. It also means that the citizens are free to act anarchically, because there are no regulations covering them [3]. Another reaction to its positive side is that the implementation of direct regional elections is the most tangible form of democracy since everyone can be given the widest possible opportunity to determine their leaders. However, negative team look more critically at some of the articles contained in this law which are anti-democracy. For instance, the existence of monopoly rights in the regional head nomination, the excessive authority from Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) and the loss Central General Election Commission's (KPU) role. The critical people of this law come from activists for empowering civil society rights, democratization observer, and General Election Commission members.

Like the adage "it's no use crying over spilt milk" apart from all the shortcomings contained in this law, the law has been decided and must be implemented to choose the regional head. Therefore, the debate is no longer about content, but on the structure or rather the political and social infrastructure and tourism sites that will implement and become a space for this law enactment [4]. Now, the question is how ready are the political and social infrastructure and tourism sites in the regions to conduct direct regional elections in Indonesia?

The question above is important, not because we are pessimistic, but it will be the key to success or failure of the direct election process. It will be an effort to tackle the doubts at the same time [5]. Therefore, this question remains us to be optimistic and rightful. This question is also important for several reasons: 1) we do not have the experience and tradition of conducting direct elections with major political and psychological escalation. It is undeniable that direct election tradition has often conducted but it is limited to the election of the Village Head. It also means that it is very small and does not have a complicated political process involving strong institutions such as Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD), and Political Parties; 2) A number of frauds was committed by the electoral apparatus in the last legislative and presidential elections, regarding Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD) and its staff. However, the frauds did not affect the political situation majorly because: a) the political victims were legislative candidates with shoe numbers who would not cause extraordinary political escalation. This is also influenced by the party's internal interests which hinder the potential for political escalation that may occur.

In line with those frauds, there was a candidate who complained to a member of the Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD). The Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD) members asked him how many votes he got. If it was less than one hundred or two hundred, they said they could still adjust. However, if it was more than that it was a bit difficult. There was a possibility that this incidents happened in direct regional elections in various regions; b) the emotional ties between the harmed candidates and The Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD) members was far so it did not generate sentiments that lead to open conflict. It happened in the last presidential election. "The gap was too far between the needs for realizing SBY's interests and our daily needs so we have to shake it off," said a voter who witnessed fraud in the polling stations (TPS); 3) The performance of election case supervisory and judiciary institutions were slow to resolve fraud cases complaints in election. Until its dissolution, The Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) left many fraud cases that had not been resolved. If it happens again, it possibly can become a trigger for political conflict, riots in the regions or even mass destructive actions.

Optimism the direct elections success as a form of democratization [6], dismissed various doubts from the parties. Various empirical facts above are objective conditions underline the question whether our political and social infrastructure and tourism sites is ready to conduct direct elections or not. Now, we are not only required to complete the direct election process, but we are also required to hold direct regional elections in a higher quality and democratic way than the past.

As the research focus, the researchers conducted the study in five regencies which will immediately conduct direct regional elections in Southeast Sulawesi, namely: South Konawe Regency, North Kolaka, North Konawe, Wakatobi, Bombana, and Muna.

# 2. Regional Political Infrastructure and Tourism Sites

## a) Regional House of Representatives

Even though the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) could not vote, it does not mean that they lost a decisive role in Indonesia direct election. The council will still formally determine who the candidates will be. Moreover, the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) must be accountable for the election to this institution. Therefore, the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) still occupies an honourable position in the implementation of direct regional elections.

The question is how ready is the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) to hold direct regional election? It is related to several questions, namely: 1) its human resources; 2) its members' mental. It has shown that the process of drafting various regional regulations, including in the implementation of regional elections, is always done by copying and pasting existing products or draft regulations. Therefore, it is not surprising that the draft rules or decrees discussed in the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) plenary from the past until now have not changed. By the new electoral system and the demand to realize a high-quality election, copy and paste tradition can no longer be used. The problem is whether the current legislative members in the regions could reform such traditions?

In most of regions, the candidates are dominated by 1) high school graders with problems; 2) retired parents, and 3) novices who do not have any experiences as legislators. With this condition, it is certainly difficult for the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) to be responsible for their duties. As we know that studying, understanding, interpreting various new laws, and interpreting government regulations requires above average skills.

Apart from the doubts about their human resources, we also doubt about their mental quality, especially dealing with money [7]. By the time, this institution has never been separated from unpleasant problems with financial management, both during regional elections and the management of Local Government Budget (APBD). This institution is never devoid of unpleasant issues. In fact, some people's motivation to enter this institution is to get the maximum economic benefits. Perhaps, the Regional House Representative Council candidate would also have this motivation.

Even though the regional head has been directly elected by the citizens, the process to reach stage is quite long and one of them is through the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD). In this part, the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) is most likely playing its trump card. In the previous election, the opportunity for the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) to 'blackmail' candidates for Regional Head was during the plenary session. However, it is now converted into the determination or finalization of Regional Head candidates. Even though it seems a piece of cake, but the position might be greater.

In connection with their position as a part where the Regional General Election Commission KPUD is responsible in the direct election process, it is also possible that problems will arise [8]. There is no guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted by the legislatures. With such a large role and decisive position, it is technically possible for the House Representative Council (DPR) to intervene the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD). This is the critical space and condition where the doubt becomes so rational. Generally, Indonesia has had a poor experience in managing relations between electoral institutions, such as how tensions arose between the House Representative Council (DPR) and General Election Commission (KPU), between General Election Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu), and

the past presidential election. This kind of condition is probably could be repeated in the next direct elections, especially since current the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) are not very familiar and professional managing election problems.

Apart from the facts above, the decision of Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) as people's representative institution in the direct regional election is very prone to political bias based on their political parties. This condition is very possible. If we look at the composition of the legislative members in the regions that will join direct elections, it appears that the composition of the existing members is generally not balanced. There is one political party that has a number of seats so it can form a faction in the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) and a number of other parties that do not have enough seats to form one faction as required by law. Therefore, they chose to form a joint faction with members, and sometimes it is more than the intact party faction. Of course, such conditions will also affect how to decide decisions related to direct elections.

#### b) Regional General Election Commission

The Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) is an institution that will technically hold direct regional elections. This institution' role is very important because it is directly related to how the candidates' administration will be examined, how the election rules and techniques are disseminated to the public, how the technical structure of election organizers in each sub-district and village is determined, how the number of compulsory voters is distributed, the electoral display tools are prepared, and how the vote results are managed by the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD).

The General Election Commission (KPU) is required to consistently carry out all its duties and authorities. The duties and powers of the General Election Commission (KPU) are regulated in such a way as in Article 8 of Law No. 15 of 2011. Related to the technical implementation of elections, the tasks and authorities can be simplified into eight stages of elections that must be guarded by the General Election Commission (KPU) to follow the schedule. The eight stages are 1) registration and updating of the voter list; 2) registration, research, and determination of voters; 3) establishment and amendment of electoral districts; 4) registration, research, and determination of candidates; 5) campaign and reporting the receipt and expenditure of campaign funds; 6) voting and counting votes at polling stations, and recapitulation of vote results at various levels at the polling station; 7) division of seats and determination of elected candidates; and 8) settlement of disputes voting results.

Regarding the roles of the General Election Commission (KPUD), the question is how ready the General Election Commission (KPUD) will work professionally. In this context, it is important for us to highlight the existence and independence of the General Election Commission (KPUD) as the organizer of elections in the regions. The areas in Southeast Sulawesi that have implemented direct regional elections are South Konawe, North Kolaka, North Konawe, Buton, Bombana, Kolaka, North Buton, Konawe, and Bau-Bau. Muna is the first regency to conduct direct regional elections in Southeast Sulawesi. Thus, Muna's Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) has experienced managing elections while the other regions have no experience. Moreover, there will be a district expansion in Southeast Sulawesi that includes West Muna, East Konawe, West Buton, and East Kolaka. This condition cannot be taken lightly from two perspectives, namely: 1) the untested integrity of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) members and 2) the non-existed ability to manage elections.

First, the untested integrity issue. An unpleasant issue of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) is bribery against the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) members who select them. It is a bad start for them to start working as election administrators who require a high level of personal integrity. How can we expect them to become good election organizers if they have been involved in the practice of collusion from the beginning?

Experiences tell that votes trading were well-known among them, whether it was carried out by the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) itself or by Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) ranks at lower levels such as District Election Committee (PPK) and Voting Committee (PPS). Even in Muna, the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) is

often accused of being the crony of the Regent and Golkar Party. Moreover, the low-level ranks of the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) such as District Election Committee (PPK) and Voting Committee (PPS) are elected by the Regent's wishes and to some extent obeying the orders of the Camat.

This behaviour will surely occur on a larger scale and intensity. It is due to two factors, namely: 1) from the competitors' perspective, they have very high enthusiasm or motivation to win so they will do everything, including practicing money politics against the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) members; 2) Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) members have already had previous experience with such methods, they have understood enough how to do fraud in the safest way. Among those Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) members who committed fraud, it was noted that only one Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) member was jailed, namely the Chairman of Konawe's Regional General Election Commission (KPUD). This means positive for the development of money politics practices within the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD). Now, the existence of a new Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) will certainly add more unpleasant stories. Second, the non-existed ability to manage elections. The problem is how they will be able to manage the direct elections that will be held soon. Unlike some regions, where the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) has been established for a long time and has experience managing elections, this is their first experience. These conditions are very prone to mismanagement of the elections: how to distribute voters into each polling station, provide and distribute election props, count and tabulate votes is a tough job that does not have to be done by trial and error. Mistakes or mismanagement can lead to several possibilities, such as delays in the election process, conflict or violence between factions, and waste of election costs.

In this context, regions that had Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) were more ready to hold direct regional elections than the new regions. Therefore, anticipatory and strategy are needed so that the bad possibilities in the direct elections can be prevented early.

#### c) Political Parties

Political parties are media of articulating people's need [9]. The definition of a political party is a political group that participates in general elections and it places its candidates to hold public office through the general election. In direct elections, political parties will capture people's aspirations to have the ideal Regional Head, and it is the political party that acts as an intermediary in the process of obtaining state decisions, which connects citizens with state institutions. Political Parties, A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, organization is the only economic or political mean to form collective will [10].

The question is how ready are the political parties in regions to articulate people's need? Are political parties ready to open a convention for the nomination of Regional Heads to allow independence to be nominated as Regional Heads?

In Southeast Sulawesi, there is a tendency for political parties to not open the process of removing regional heads through conventions, especially Golkar party. In South Konawe, the party chairman himself is the regent from Golkar, as well as in Muna. It means that Golkar does not provide access to other parties to compete with it. In fact, the two regions mentioned above were nominated for the party chairman [11]. It does not only close the opportunities to outsiders but at the same time prevent other potential party cadres to compete.

This condition is contrary to the spirit of creating political parties as a mean of delivering people's needs as discussed above [12]. With this reality, political parties are only limited to deliver the needs of elite party management and nothing more. If Golkar Party want to have good image outside the party and in the eyes of the people, they should open about the nomination process through a party convention [13]. This movement is nothing new for Golkar Party, they have experience in the Central Executive Board (DPP). When the president was inaugurated, Golkar was a very open and democratic party compared to other parties, such as PDIP and PAN. At that time, Golkar opened the presidential nomination process by means of a party convention that successfully knocked out its general chairman himself. It was the greatest achievement of Golkar and Akbar Tanjung. Meanwhile, PDIP and PAN have absolute veto to nominate general

chairs, namely Megawati and Amin Rais. Looking at this perspective, Golkar and Akbar Tanjung are more democratic than PDIP, PAN and Megawati-Amin Rais.

Apparently, that tradition was not followed by any regional party. It raises the claim that there is fear among party leaders to hold a convention so that they are elected. Thus, they decide to not give opportunity to candidates from other parties [14].

Meanwhile, other parties such as PPP, PDIP, and PAN tend to open conventions to nominate regional heads. In South Konawe, for example, PPP has finished holding a convention that arose the pair of Imran and Sutroarjo. Meanwhile, PDIP and PAN are just planning to implement a party convention.

In this context, most critical parties and high-ranking officials of Golkar regions consider that convention have nothing to do with democratic matters, but it shows how pragmatic those political parties are. The convention was held because their votes made it impossible to nominate their own parties [15]. They must find another candidate who can be accepted by other parties and enable them to build a coalition with other parties that do not have enough votes [16]. They aim to achieve the minimum 15% of the votes required by law. Another oblique accusation is that the parties' convention is only a way to earn money since it is open as widely as possible for anyone who wants to become a Regional Head.

It is possible that those criticisms and accusations are also true, but the convention taken by these parties should be seen from a positive side [17]. These political parties have opened the widest opportunity for independent figures to be nominated as Regional Heads. We are waiting for other parties such as PDIP, PKS or PBB which do not have enough votes to nominate their own figures will open the convention process. We are also waiting the truth of the statement by the General Chair of the DPW who once said that PAN is intended for any candidate who can become Regional Head.

## d) Election Supervisory Agency

The Election Supervisory Agency is one of the important instruments in the administration of elections. In the previous legislative and presidential elections, the existence of the election supervisory agency, namely the Election Supervisory Committee (Panwas), was quite active in playing its role in overseeing the process of organizing the election. Apart from Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu), the police and courts are involved in handling election frauds.

The position of Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) and General Election Commission (KPU) at the Provincial/Regency/City level in holding General Election is equal to the General Election Commission (KPU). However, in the reality, the recruitment of Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) does not reflect the same positions. This is reflected in Law number 22 of 2007 concerning Election Administrators, six candidates of Provincial Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) members are proposed by the Provincial Election Supervisory Committee (KPU) to Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) and then three candidates are appointed by Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) through test. Likewise, six candidates for Regional Election Supervisory Committee are proposed by Regional Election Supervisory Committee KPU to Provincial Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu), then three people are selected as members of Regional Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu), also through a fit and proper test with a Bawaslu decision.

Initially, the existence of Election Supervisory Agency was intended to control the electoral process based on the fair and democratic elections principles [18]. Unfortunately, it was not fulfilled because it was tackled by various procedures. It could be because of unclear regulations and people's need in the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) and Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu) as well as by the traditions of the relevant institutions which took part in the election supervision process.

In the early days of Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu) formation, there was a great hope that this institution could supervise and follow up on various administrative and political election frauds. However, unfortunately, the reality speaks differently. It seems that Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu) is no more than a registrar of problems and then give it to General Election Commission (KPU) and this institution determines the continuation of the next case. In the past

election in Southeast Sulawesi, there were several conflicts between the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) and Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu) in managing election cases. Many frauds were reported by Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu) but were not solved by the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD). Another violation of election principle was flawed by Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu) was related to the public's objection of several legislative candidates who were deemed inadequate but surprisingly passed by the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD). However, when Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu) were asked for supporting administrative data about the candidates, the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) said that they had no duty to fulfill Panwaslu's request.

Furthermore, the Election Supervisory Agency itself is not independent because it has members from various elements, especially policemen and prosecutors. As a result, their performance is limited to their institutional needs [19].

In this context, we should question how the supervisory mechanism should be, the institutional relationship between the Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) and the Election Supervisory Agency (Panwaslu), and how the election supervisory agency will be formed later. It is important since it is possible that there will be frauds later. In this case, it is necessary to formulate an institutional format and work mechanism between these institutions. If this condition is not anticipated early, it is possible that direct regional elections will only trigger tension and violence among constituent people [20].

Besides, people have bad experience that can be seen from two sides, those are: 1) slow and wordy performance, and 2) unfair and untransparent decisions. The management of election cases must be solved fast unlike other general cases. Therefore, extra work is needed from policemen and courts to handle the cases. If the cases are not handled but the previous cases are not finished yet, new cases will appear, and they become pile up, so the old cases are forgotten and so on. In the previous legislative election, the delay might not cause a problem, but it would be a different story if it happened in the next direct election. People are very concerned about the results of the trial in court. Thus, slow performance will cause a tremendous escalation of conflict [21].

The next case is untransparent decision from the judges. From the last election, a candidate who has never received education and only has a fake certificate can be accepted as valid. Another case is a judge's decision that passed a legislative candidate who only had a diploma at the SGB level (Sekolah Guru Bawah) from an old school which is the same to the junior high school level now. Based on the court result, it was equivalent to senior high school. The court's decisions are hard to be logically accepted but they are the facts [22].

Therefore, it is common that many people are pessimistic about handling direct election cases in court. This attitude happened since the person who will handle the next regional elections is the same person who was also at the last legislative election. Therefore, the performance and decisions will be similar [23].

# 3. Regional Social Infrastructure and Tourism Sites

### a) Youth Community Organizations

Although youth community organizations are not directly involved in the implementation of direct election, their existence and roles are needed to control so the implementation of direct election so it can be better. However, are there any youth community organizations in this area that put themselves in that position? This question is important to ask because there are no great youth community organizations in the regions. Moreover, it should be underlined that their active involvement in taking care of the direct regional elections would not be cons.

Objectively, the existence of mass youth organizations in this area, although it does not belong to integral part of a political party, they often play political roles ordered by certain political figures. An organization, whether it is a foundation or a forum, it can be very fierce in exposing the ugliness of a character, but it can be tolerant to crimes committed by other figures. This organizations are dominant in South Konawe and Muna where they tend to be the watch dog of a particular figure. What we want to emphasize here is that the mass and youth organizations in

this area are generally very pragmatic. Therefore, it would be much better if they do not have to take in the process of the direct elections later.

The statement is very contra and tends to be democratic, but it is better than adding the workload of unprepared Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) and unready Regional General Election Commission (KPUD).

# b) Society with all its cultures

Five regions that will carry out direct regional election have various socio-cultural characteristics. In South Konawe, there are three major ethnic groups, namely the Tolaki people as the indigenous population with an estimated number of 50%, Bugis 20%, and Javanese 20%; Bombana has two major ethnicities, namely Moronene as the original population with an estimated number of around 40% and Bugis around 50%; North Kolaka has two major ethnicities, namely Tolaki as the original population with an estimated number of 20% and Bugis around 70%. Meanwhile, Muna and Wakatobi districts are relatively homogeneous. What is the relationship between the ethnic composition and direct elections?

Among the political and intellectual elites, there is a tendency to lead the election problem towards ethnicity. According to their viewpoint, the ideal pair for Regional Head candidates must accommodate or represent each of the major ethnic groups in one area. Therefore, there is a postulate about 'ideal partner', regarding South Konawe will only have an ideal partner by combining Tolaki - Bugis or Tolaki Jawa. Meanwhile, Bombana has Bugis - Moronene. However, North Kolaka has Bugis - Tolaki. From political perspective, this kind of postulate is very rational because it will easily lead people's emotions to choose the partner. However, this postulation can become a fire in the husks. Moreover, applying this method, we are unconsciously planting the seeds of real ethnic conflict.

There are several dangers of using this postulation, those are: 1) the direct election will lose the quality and it is simply about how to win the fight and to gain power. In short, the majority will win, and the minority will lose. Direct election cases are a matter of number, who has more; 2) there will be other ethnic offenses, especially minority. Knowing the pattern, they will never be considered in the local political arena or in short, become a Regional Head; 3) there will be a serious threat to the existence of the indigenous population. In North Kolaka, it is impossible for Tolaki people to be a regional head because they are indigenous people. Moreover, their population is fewer than the Bugis as immigrants. Likewise, in Bombana, where the Moronene people are natives, are far from the Bugis as immigrants, they will never become Regional Heads forever. For this reason, the postulate should be avoided as much as possible, meaning that even if such a pattern should emerge, it still emphasizes the candidate's quality and not because of the large ethnic population.

In Muna and Wakatobi, although the population tends to be homogeneous, it does not mean that they have no problem. Muna has strong political alliances and had isolated themselves for a long time so the collaboration between the different alliances is not possible. In those areas, political tensions are always present in their day-to-day life: it could be from family, village, teak, football and regents to the district head is a political issue for them - nothing is not a political matter. In the previous Regional Head elections, for example, there was tension and even threats of violence that were widespread not only among the political elite but also among the people who were already polarized. Political tensions and violence in the direct regional elections may be even stronger considering that people's access to the political process will be more open and the elite's interest will be greater to win political battles. This is where the arena for the political elite prove who really is the stronger and more populist. The political tradition in this area has a very strong feel of losing wins.

In Wakatobi District, although there are ethnic variations, these ethnic variations can be united by a greater cultural unity so that the ethnic differences are not so visible on the surface. The polarization of political power in this area was based on the economy under the rule of wealthy pilgrims. The regional election is the arena of battle for those wealthy hajis to prove who has more influence and has more money. Even though political power is based on the trade economy, it still has the potential to trigger conflict between business and political groups. Their rough culture means that they will not easily accept defeat.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

Based on the long description above, it can be concluded that the political and social infrastructure and tourism sites in the regions is not yet ready to carry out higher quality regional elections. The existing objective conditions can only carry out direct elections as a mere political routine. Therefore, to actualise a higher quality direct regional election, the following steps are required: 1) It is necessary to strengthen the human resource capacity of Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) and Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) members especially to prepare and implement the direct elections that will be held soon. 2) It is necessary to encourage and campaign for the party convention system in the process of nominating regional heads. 3) It is necessary to establish a strong and independent election supervisory agency that has broader, clearer, more decisive authority, and able to work quickly and professionally. 4) It is necessary to establish a special judiciary for election cases consisting of the police, prosecutors and district court judges who can work quickly and professionally. Moreover, they should have binding legal decisions and have permanent legal force. 5) It is necessary to encourage independent youth social organizations to control the performance of the electoral apparatus including the Regional House Representative Council (DPRD), Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) and the upcoming election supervisory bodies. 6) It is necessary to promote and campaign for peaceful elections as well as political education for the people, especially those containing direct election material. 7) It is necessary to make an agreement among political groups competing in the regional elections facilitated by Regional House Representative Council (DPRD) and Regional General Election Commission (KPUD) and the police to prevent possible conflicts that occur in the process and post-election.

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