he most crucial issue of money politics in the election is the high cost of contestation borne by candidates in the election process. The study's objective is to analyze the causes of high political costs in regional head elections in Indonesia and the steps to reform the regional election system in the future. The study used a qualitative-descriptive method with a desk study technique, namely examining data sourced from literature and regulations and those related to the elections. The study found that political costs are high in regional head elections because, first, oligarchs control political parties because of the party's power to recruit candidates. In practice, recruiting candidates by political parties and coalitions of political parties are closed, elitist, and undemocratic. Party elites or oligarchs have the power to select and determine candidate pairs to fight in the regional elections. The nomination of candidates is not an arena for contesting capacities and capabilities, but rather an arena for capital struggle, popularity, and closeness to oligarchs or political party elites. Second, there are loopholes in regulations that open up space for high-cost politics, namely (1) a centralized nominating system; (2) Requirements for nomination at the political party level are too high and (3) The requirements for nomination by independent candidates are too stringent. The steps to improve the election system are to enhance the legal framework of the elections, namely institutionalizing the pre-election process, decentralizing the authority of political parties' management, reducing the parliamentary threshold for both parties and independent candidates.